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REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES
Recommendation
RESOLVED, that the American Bar Association opposes the
substance of Rules 413, 414, and 415 of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence concerning the admission of evidence in sexual assault and
child molestation cases, as enacted by the Violent Crime Control
and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat.
1796 (1994).*
343
* Editor's Note: The American Bar Association House of Delegates adopted this
resolution at its midyear meeting on February 13, 1995.
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Report**
On September 13, 1994, President Clinton signed the "Violent
Crime Control and Enforcement Act of 1994,' '1 which contains
new Rules 413, 414 and 415 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
These rules govern the admission of evidence in criminal cases in
which the accused is charged with an offense of sexual assault or
child molestation, and of civil cases in which a claim for damages or
other relief is predicated on conduct constituting an offense of sex-
ual assault or child molestation. Pursuant to the rules, evidence of
the defendant's or party's commission of another offense or of-
fenses is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any
matter to which it is relevant.
The law provides for the effective date of the rules to be delayed,
giving the Judicial Conference of the United States 150 days to re-
view them and submit recommendations to Congress. If the Judi-
cial Conference's recommendations are different from the rules,
the effective date is delayed an additional 150 days, during which
time Congress can reconsider the rules. If Congress does not act
on the Judicial Conference's recommendations, the Rules included
in the law become effective 150 days after the transmittal of the
Judicial Conference's recommendations.
In October, 1994, the American Bar Association submitted com-
ments to the Rules of Practice and Procedure Committee of the
Judicial Conference concerning the issues posed by Rules 413, 414
and 415 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Those comments were
based on the Association's Rules Enabling Act policy related to
the manner in which rules should be promulgated for the federal
courts.2
The comments criticized the bypassing of the Rules Enabling
Act process. By evading the longstanding process designed to pro-
mulgate rules only after extensive thoughtful review by the entire
legal community, Congress challenged the entire rulemaking struc-
ture. In particular, the comments pointed out that the careful re-
view inherent in the public comment process was designed to
eliminate unwarranted changes or changes which have unintended
** This report was written by Professor Myrna S. Raeder, who is a Professor of
Law at Southwestern University School of Law and the former chairperson of the
Criminal Justice Section's Committee on Federal Rules of Evidence and Criminal
Procedure. The Report was prepared in support of the attached American Bar
Association House of Delegates resolution.
1. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796.
2. See ABA HousE OF DELEGATES REPORT No. 118B (January, 1982).
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consequences. In light of the number of serious ambiguities in the
rules, the abbreviated public comment period is particularly dis-
turbing. In addition, requiring affirmative Congressional action to
modify Rules 413-415 effectively precludes the likelihood of any
revision, despite the real possibility that substantial and substantive
comments would be generated when the rules were briefly distrib-
uted for public review. Ultimately, if the rulemaking structure is
ignored any time that a rule is likely to generate controversy, the
entire integrity of the Rules Enabling Act is subverted.
The comments also noted the absence of any ABA policy di-
rected at the use of propensity evidence cases concerning sexual
abuse due, no doubt, in part to the fact that these rules are in direct
conflict with the existing federal rules. The only related ABA pol-
icy concerned the use of prior bad acts evidence pursuant to Rule
404(b). In United States v. Huddleston,3 the Supreme Court viewed
the preliminary fact question of whether a defendant had commit-
ted the prior bad act as a Rule 104(b) issue. This holding over-
turned the longstanding requirement of most courts that clear and
convincing evidence was required for the admission of such acts
due to their inherent prejudice. The ABA resolution urges that
Rule 404(b) be amended to provide that the court shall determine
the preliminary fact question by a clear and convincing evidence
standard. Thus, the ABA had previously viewed with suspicion ev-
idence which legitimately fit within Rule 404(b) in order to ensure
that courts carefully exercise their gatekeeping responsibilities.
The ABA policy report supporting the Rule 404(b) resolution as-
sumed that propensity evidence was inadmissible and simply spoke
to the prejudice which may occur by jurors who use the evidence
incorrectly for its propensity purposes.
Ensuing events have validated a number of the concerns ex-
pressed in the ABA comments. The Summary of Comments on
New Evidence Rules 413-415 prepared by the Rules Committee
Support Office of the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, indicates that 100 individuals and organizations opposed
the rules, 10 supported them and 18 recommended modifications
or were neutral. Opponents included 11 lawyers, 56 evidence
professors, 19 judges, and 12 organizations, among others. The
reasons for opposition to the rules were as follows:
3. 485 U.S. 681 (1988).
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Circumvents Rules Enabling Act 7
Constitutional Concerns 19
Insufficient Data on Propensity 33
Unfair 58
Unnecessary 16
Impact on Native Americans 4
Drafting Problems 47
In October, 1994, these rules were considered by two Advisory
Committees of the Judicial Conference. The Advisory Committee
on the Criminal Rules of Procedure sent a memorandum to the
Evidence Advisory Committee noting its concern over the last
minute addition of the rules without prior input from the Judicial
Conference. The Committee specified its previous rejection of
such rules by an 8 to 1 vote, and again voted 8 to 1 to oppose the
adoption of rules permitting propensity evidence in sex cases and
expressed its view that Rule of Evidence 404(b) was an "adequate
vehicle" to introduce other crimes evidence. In addition the
"Committee seriously questioned whether Rules 413-415 are worth
the danger of convicting a defendant for his past, as opposed to
charged behavior." Concerning the content of the rules, the Com-
mittee suggested several drafting changes, including combining the
three rules into one and requiring that the prosecution be required
to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the alleged act had
occurred.
In contrast, when the Evidence Advisory Committee met in No-
vember, 1994 to consider the Congressionally passed rules, while
the Committee remained opposed to the content of the rules, it
viewed the policy decision to permit propensity evidence as a Con-
gressional fait accompli. As a result, the Evidence Advisory Com-
mittee is "urging Congress to reconsider its decision on the policy
questions. If Congress does not do so, the committee is recom-
mending that its alternative language be adopted."5 In other
words, the Committee limited its redrafting of the three rules to
"correct ambiguities and possible constitutional infirmities identi-
fied in Rules 413-415 and remain consistent with Congressional in-
4. See Memo to Hon. D. Lowell Jensen, From Professor Dave Schlueter, Re-
porter, October 11, 1994, Re: Advisory Committee's Discussion of Federal Rules of
Evidence 413-415.
5. Letter from Peter G. McCabe, Secretary, Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States, Re: Proposed New Rules
413-415 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (Dec. 2, 1994).
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tent."6 Therefore, it did not attempt to dilute the content of the
rules. In fact, both during and after the Committee meeting, input
from the original drafters of the rules was incorporated. While it is
fair to say that the end result of this process is a more coherent,
better written version of the earlier rules, it is disturbing that the
only support for propensity rules within either of the two Advisory
Committees of the Judicial Conference came from the Department
of Justice representative. Such support was not unexpected, since
the rules were originally drafted by the Department of Justice dur-
ing the administration of President Bush. In other words, none of
the judges, academics or other lawyers on either Committee would
have adopted these rules.
Rules 413-415 were included in the final version of the Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 in order to ob-
tain a key vote in favor of the legislation. Even assuming that the
Judicial Conference recommends to Congress that the Evidence
Advisory Committee's redraft of the propensity rules should be
substituted for the present rules, Rules 413-415 will go into effect
as presently worded unless Congress takes affirmative action. If
the rules become effective due to Congressional inaction, extensive
litigation can be expected concerning their scope. Significant ques-
tions unanswered by the text of Rules 413-415 include whether the
judge has any discretion to exclude prejudicial prior bad acts,
whether expert testimony of sexual deviancy is permitted, and
whether hearsay evidence of prior bad acts can be introduced.
Moreover, while due process issues may be raised concerning any
evidence introduced solely for propensity,' such questions would
be magnified if Rules 413-415 were interpreted as completely
prohibiting the exclusion of propensity evidence.
Given this background, the American Bar Association House of
Delegates resolution appended to this report opposes Federal
Rules of Evidence 413-415. First, it should be clear what this reso-
lution does not do. Evidence which is legitimately within F.R.E.
Rule 404(b) is not affected by this resolution. Lawyers and judges
recognize the difficulties associated with proving sexual abuse in
cases involving adults as well as children. Problems in proof fre-
quently stem from the absence of other witnesses or corroboration.
When the defendant claims consent, the trial often becomes a cred-
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., McKinney v. Rees, 993 F.2d 1378, 1385 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 622 (1993) (erroneous admission of propensity evidence rendered trial fundamen-
tally unfair in violation of due process).
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ibility contest. Where young children are involved, their discom-
fort about testifying or inability to communicate may intertwine
with competency questions.
Society is currently struggling with ways to ensure that the guilty
do not escape punishment without the wholesale abandonment of
the evidentiary and constitutional protections of criminal defend-
ants. The federal constitution has been interpreted to permit chil-
dren to testify out of the presence of the defendant when an
individualized showing can be made that the child would be trau-
matized by face to face confrontation.8 Child hearsay is now ad-
mitted under traditional hearsay exceptions as well as by hearsay
catchalls and in some states by specific child hearsay exceptions.
Expert testimony is used extensively in all types of sexual abuse
cases. The Rape Shield rule protects against the complainant being
put on trial for her own consensual sexual conduct.
Moreover, existing caselaw in state and federal courts generously
interprets Rule 404(b) to permit evidence of the defendant's prior
bad acts in sex crimes cases so long as any nexus exists to a purpose
other than propensity. Therefore, to the extent that the prior acts
indicate motive, intent, opportunity, identity, or common scheme
or plan, those acts are legitimately admitted under current law.
Similarly, as Professor Imwinkelried has argued, the doctrine of
chances may provide an alternative noncharacter route for the
most egregious evidence of bad acts.9 In other words, in determin-
ing whether an act was criminal, the doctrine of chances permits
the use of reasoning which asks "[h]ow statistically likely is it that
an innocent individual would be accused of the same type of crime
on several different occasions[ ]". The inference is not that the per-
son is bad, and therefore more likely to commit the current crime,
but rather that the possibility of repeated unfounded accusals is
remote, unless there is another explanation which could account
for the previous complaints. The most obvious use of this reason-
ing is in cases of multiple unexplained deaths happening in a simi-
lar manner, when the evidence that any one death was a homicide.
However, this rationale has been extended to sexual misconduct
cases on the theory that it is unlikely that one individual would be
falsely accused of several completely separate similar incidents.' °
8. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
9. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Dispute Over the Doctrine of Chances, 7 CRIM.
JUST. 16 (1992).
10. See People v. VanderVliet, 80-81, 508 N.W.2d 114, 129 (1993), amended on
other grounds, 520 N.W.2d 338 (1994); see also People v. Balcom, 867 P.2d 777, 785
348
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Obviously, when the doctrine of chances is used, a proper founda-
tion must be established and the evidence carefully evaluated to
exclude acts that have no other purpose than propensity.
Undoubtedly, a few cases will always exist in which the only rele-
vancy link for admission is propensity and exclusion may result in
what some believe to be an unwarranted retrial or acquittal. How-
ever, to catch that relatively small number of cases, the proponents
of Rules 413-415 would drastically alter one of the fundamental
premises underlying the Federal Rules of Evidence. Currently, we
do not round up the regular suspects and try them based on evi-
dence of who they are rather than what they did in the particular
case. Wigmore characterized the prejudice associated with charac-
ter evidence as "the overstrong tendency to believe the accused
guilty of the charge merely because he is a likely person to do such
acts [and] the tendency to condemn not because the accused is be-
lieved guilty of the present charge but because he escaped unpun-
ished from other offenses.""
Prejudice can result from overestimating the probative value of
character evidence, or punishing the accused for past conduct or
other crimes the defendant may have committed or will commit.
Obviously, the prejudice of such acts is great. Jurors may be over-
whelmed by an emotional response to the evidence which inter-
feres with their ability to hold the prosecution to its burden of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. They may not care if sufficient
evidence of guilt exists because they feel less responsibility for con-
victing an individual who they know has committed previous bad
acts. Ultimately, the jury may reach its verdict without deciding
the defendant's guilt in the present case.
Rules permitting propensity evidence are particularly inadvisa-
ble in light of developing scientific evidence which has consistently
demonstrated the high percentage of mistaken identifications in
cases where the assailant's identity is at issue. Approximately 30%
of cases submitted to the FBI laboratory for DNA analysis result in
the known suspect's DNA not matching the specimen taken from
the scene.' 2 If police work and identifications are mistaken in so
(1994), Arabian, J. (concurring) (if two people claim rape and their stories are suffi-
ciently similar, the chances that both are lying or one truthful and the other invented
a false story that just happens to be similar, is greatly diminished).
11. 1A JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 58.2 (Peter
Tillers ed., 1983).
12. See, e.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC
SCIENCE 88 (1992); Begley, et. al., Blood, Hair and Heredity, NEWSWEEK, July 11,
1994, at 24.
1995] 349
350 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXII
many cases involving violent crimes, one must wonder why the ju-
dicial system would want to encourage convictions in such cases
based on propensity evidence. In other words, the admission of
character evidence allows the jury to convict the defendant by in-
ferring that if he has committed a previous sexual crime, he com-
mitted the current one. However, the reason that many sex
offenders are originally identified is because of their inclusion in
mug books of sexual offenders. Thus, it is predictable that in many
cases where a victim has been raped by a stranger, the defendant
will have been charged with prior sexual crimes. If the prior con-
viction has a relevance other than propensity, it will be admitted
without the need for any change in the rules.
The driving force behind the proposed rules appear to be di-
rected at two types of cases: 1) those in which the defense to rape is
consent, and 2) those in which a pedophile preys on numerous
young children. However, the rules are not so limited. One would
assume that such a dramatic change in the philosophy underlying
the rules would have called for some empirical justification. Had
the rules gone through the Rules Enabling Act process, such proof
would likely have been demanded. It is unclear that such evidence
does exist. The early belief was that sexual offenders had very low
recidivism rates. Recent recidivism rates for sexual offenders also
appear to be lower than for most other categories. 13 Exhibitionists
appear to have the highest recidivism rates of other sex offenders.' 4
But even these are described as less than the national average of all
recidivists.15 Other commentators question the methodology of
studies of recidivism of sexual offenders.' 6 Yet none of the com-
mentators appear to posit that recidivism in sexual offenses is
higher than rates for other types of crime.
Indeed, the relevant question is not simply whether sexual of-
fenders have high recidivism rates, but is character evidence of sex-
ual crimes more predictive than character evidence of other
crimes? Unfortunately, recidivism rates are unacceptably high for
all crimes. Therefore, if propensity is allowed for sex crimes, how
is this to be distinguished from using propensity in other cases, ex-
13. David P. Bryden & Roger C. Park, "Other Crimes" Evidence in Sex Offense
Cases, 78 MINN. L. REV. 529 (1994); ALLEN J. BECK, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1983 6 (1989).
14. Thomas J. Reed, Reading Goal Revisited: Admission of Uncharged Miscon-
duct Evidence in Sex Offender Cases, 21 AM. J. CRIM. L. 127, 154 (1992).
15. Id. at 149, 155.
16. Lita Furbey et al., Sex Offender Recidivism: A Review, 105 PSYCHOL. BULL. 3,
4 (1989).
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cept for the outrage which is understandably directed at the com-
mission of sexual crimes? 7 3 While sexual offenses are often hard
to prove, so are drug conspiracies and other categories of crimes.
To the extent that some will argue that sexual propensity evi-
dence has previously been permitted under the guise of evidence
showing a "lustful disposition," several points should be made.
First, when this exception first became popular, deviant sexual of-
fenders were assumed to be highly recidivistic and rare.' 8 Second,
the predominant use of such evidence was limited to child abuse
cases.' 9 Third, the pure propensity use of such evidence was often
masked because of instructions which focused on whether the prior
acts showed a sexual deviation of the same nature as revealed by
the present crime. In other words, prosecutors were not permitted
to argue that the defendant should be convicted because he is a
sexual offender. While Rules 413-415 may prompt this type of
closing argument, convictions based on status are constitutionally
prohibited. 20 Fourth, propensity evidence has been rejected by the
Federal Rules and states adopting Rule 404. Fifth, while one com-
mentator argued that a number of states still permit such evidence
in sexual abuse cases,2' some of those decisions predate the adop-
tion of Federal and State versions of Rule 404. Newer opinions
often stretch to permit sexual crimes evidence, but they do so by
enlarging the concepts of common plan or scheme, or modus oper-
andi, not by relying on character evidence.22
If Rules 413-415 are promulgated, they may become the first
volley in a larger attempt to reject the ban against character evi-
dence. For example, Ms. Davies, a commentator widely quoted as
favoring a more generous approach to the admissibility of relevant
character evidence, makes no distinction between sexual crimes
17. See Bryden & Park, supra n.13, at 572.
18. See generally EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCr § 4.14.
19. See, e.g., Bryden & Park, supra n. 14, at 558.
20. See Robinson v. California 370 U.S. 660 (1992); Edward J. Imwinkelried, A
Small Contribution to the Debate Over the Proposed Legislation Abolishing the Char-
acter Evidence Prohibition in Sex Offense Prosecutions (forthcoming CORNELL L.
REV. 1995) (arguing that even if Rules 413-415 are enacted, the defendant would be
entitled to an instruction limiting the use of character evidence).
21. See Thomas J. Reed, supra n.13, at'159.
22. See, e.g., People v. Balcom, 7 Cal. 4th 414, 867 P.2d 777 (1994) (uncharged
rapes not admissible to prove intent, but admissible to prove manifestations of com-
mon design or plan); see also PAUL F. ROTHSTEIN, EVIDENCE IN A NUT SHELL 355-56
(1981) (arguing that on occasion a specific propensity may rise to the level of a com-
mon plan).
1995]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXII
and other crimes.2 3 However, unlike the balance struck by the
drafters of Rules 413-415, she is quite concerned about prejudice
and suggests a balancing approach which favors the exclusion of
character evidence unless the proponent demonstrates that its pro-
bative value outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice. 4 Moreover,
she would require a foundation of clear and convincing evidence
for admission of prior acts.2 5
Even if one were comfortable with a policy shift allowing pro-
pensity evidence in sexual cases, and empirical evidence appeared
to support a propensity rule for certain types of sexual offenders,
Rules 413-415 cast their net much more widely, treating all sexual
offenses and offenders as fungible. As previously mentioned, the
scientific evidence concerning stranger rapes indicate that these are
the very types of crimes which are often subject to mistaken identi-
fications. Nor are all child abusers pedophiles.
In addition, it is clear that Rules 413-415 only apply to a small
number of cases, those which are within federal jurisdiction. Ironi-
cally, even the proponents of the rules recognize this fact and view
their enactment as a symbolic victory which will serve as a model
for state rules. As a practical matter, in federal criminal cases, the
effect will be felt in Indian territory where what would otherwise
be state crimes are prosecuted in federal court. Other questions of
fairness aside, should such a significant and controversial rule
change be adopted which will primarily impact Native Americans?
To the extent that the Military Rules of Evidence are required to
follow the federal rules, a built-in delay of 180 days exists from the
effective date of any new federai rule, during which time Rules
413-415 can be reviewed and modifications suggested which can be
enacted by Presidential order.
Given the numerous troubling features of Rules 413-415, it is
disquieting that an unintended result of their enactment may be to
produce a backlash against the strict interpretation of the federal
Rape Shield Rule 412. For example, judges may be more likely to
admit evidence of the complainant's sexual history when the de-
fendant's prior sexual acts are offered for propensity and credibil-
ity is key. There are obvious distinctions between the prior
consensual acts of a complainant and prior unconsented acts of the
23. See Susan Marlene Davies, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: A Reas-
sessment of Relevancy, 27 CRIM. L. BULL. 504, 534 (1991); see also Reed, supra n.14,
at 145.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 536.
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defendant. However, when judges are faced with the admission of
character evidence, some may feel constrained to admit otherwise
excluded evidence of the complainant's sexual history on the the-
ory that it is constitutionally required. The only way to challenge
such results would be by the unsatisfactory route of petitioning for
mandamus. It would be unfortunate if complainants hesitated to
bring sexual charges because Rules 413-415 resulted in less predict-
ability about whether their own backgrounds would become am-
munition for impeachment at trial.
Moreover, to date no one has focused on how these rules might
work in civil cases. The rape shield has recently been extended to
cover sexual harassment. However, given the broader discretion of
the judge in civil cases, Rule 412's protection may be illusory if
judges routinely admit the complainant's sexual history when they
admit propensity acts of the defendant. Similarly, defendants may
claim prior touching by the plaintiff to open the question of the
complainant's sexual activity. Conversely, defendants accused of
sexual harassment will face the likelihood of their entire sexual his-
tory being admitted without any direct link to the case. Where an
employer is also sued, and the evidence is not work-related, addi-
tional questions of prejudice may arise.
While the public sentiment against sexual offenders is shared by
everyone, Rules 413-415 are ill designed and raise troubling policy
issues. The legal community should not sit silent while Congress
imposes these rules in an effort to appear tough on crime, but with-
out a full consideration of the numerous issues raised by their
enactment.
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